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Assessing constructivist approaches from a sociocultural 
perspective  
Anna Traianou, Go
 
eachers’ Adequacy of Subject Knowledge in Primary Science: 
ldsmiths, UK  
bstract 
In recent years, increasing emphasis has come to be placed, both by researchers and by 
rs, on the adequacy of primary teachers’ subject knowledge of science. Within 
y of 
 
ing 
troduction  
Over the past 20 years there has been increased emphasis on the importance of subject 
omponent of teacher expertise. This is particularly true in the field of 
rimary science education (see, e.g., Harlen, 1996; Summers, 1994; Summers, Kruger, & 
prior conceptions about the phenomena being 
A
policy-make
research, this emphasis has been linked to the rise of constructivist ideas about the 
significance of establishing children’s prior conceptions of scientific concepts for effective 
teaching. In this article I examine two constructivist approaches to teachers’ adequac
subject knowledge within UK research on primary science education. In each case I 
provide a critique of the assumptions they make about the nature of knowledge and how it
develops. I do this from a sociocultural perspective, which views knowledge and learn
as necessarily situated within communities of practice. My aim is to assess the 
implications of this perspective for understanding teachers’ adequacy of subject 
knowledge.  
 
In
knowledge as a c
p
Mant, 1997a). From this point of view, the effective teaching of primary science depends 
on the adequacy of teachers’ understanding both of scientific knowledge and of the ways 
in which this knowledge can be taught successfully to children.  
 
This stress on subject knowledge arose, to some extent, from the growing influence of 
constructivist perspectives about learning and teaching. These perspectives emphasize 
the importance of establishing learners’ 
studied and the need for teachers to challenge these everyday conceptions directly, so as 
to help pupils acquire understanding of scientific concepts (see, e.g., Driver, 1984; Driver 
& Oldham, 1986; Harlen & Osborne, 1985; Summers, 1994). It is argued that, in order to 
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be able to do this, teachers must have sound science subject knowledge and an 
appropriate understanding of constructivist theories of learning.  
 
During the 1990s, on the basis of this perspective, research was carried out into teachers’ 
nderstanding of the scientific knowledge that was included in the newly introduced UK 
blished 
, 1987–
owledge in science what is often implied is 
at, in order to be effective, a primary teacher must have a level of subject knowledge 
ng 
ws 
e 
 
assumptions about the nature of knowledge and 
ow it develops that underpin these two constructivist views. I will do this from the 
ledge 
n 
u
Primary Science National Curriculum (e.g., Harlen & Holroyd, 1995, 1996; Kruger, 
Palacio, & Summers, 1990; Kruger & Summers, 1989; Summers & Kruger, 1990; 
Summers & Mant, 1995), and specific professional development projects were esta
aimed at helping teachers acquire the necessary evidence base (see, e.g., SPACE
1990; Summers, Kruger, & Mant, 1997a, b).  
 
In discussing teachers’ adequacy of subject kn
th
above some specified threshold. This has been suggested by Harlen (2000), for example, 
who argues that teachers need to have a “foundation for building a framework for teachi
science” (p. 7). However, among researchers in primary science education there are 
different views about what this foundation should consist of, which are shaped by different 
interpretations of constructivism. Indeed, it is possible to identify two constructivist vie
about teacher expertise, which treat subject knowledge both in some similar and in some 
distinctive ways. Thus, for one group of researchers, those who I will refer to as “small 
range” constructivists, the foundation of teachers’ knowledge should consist of teachers’ 
adequate conceptual understanding of a small range of science concepts included in th
UK National Curriculum (Summers et al., 1997a, b; Summers & Mant, 1995, 1998).1 For 
another group of researchers, those whom I call “big ideas” constructivists, this foundation
should take the form of adequate conceptual understanding of broad scientific principles, 
along with understanding of the nature of a proper scientific orientation (Harlen, 1999, 
2000; Harlen & Holroyd, 1995, 1996).  
 
In this article I will examine in detail the 
h
perspective of a rather different—sociocultural—approach to understanding knowledge 
and learning. This third perspective stresses the complex interdependence of know
and action, and argues that knowledge and understanding are necessarily situated withi
the specific activities of communities of practice (se, e.g., Lave, 1988; Lave & Wenger, 
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1991; Wenger, 1998). My aim is to provide a critical analysis of the two main constructivist
lines of thinking that have been used within UK research in primary science education, 
and to compare their implications for notions of teacher expertise with those of a 
sociocultural perspective.  
 
 
Small Range” Constructivists  
s argue that there is a substantial lack of conceptual 
bout many areas of the UK Primary Science 
ational Curriculum (e.g., Kruger et al., 1990; Summers & Kruger, 1992), and that a 
ry 
cially 
te conceptual understanding of all 
e concept areas included in the UK Primary Science National Curriculum (Summers & 
 
ed 
e 
s 
al 
 physical world, 
ut they draw a sharp distinction between these everyday conceptualizations and sound 
t science 
 
“
“Small range” constructivist
understanding among primary teachers a
N
considerable number of them experience great difficulty in acquiring the necessa
scientific understanding (see, e.g., Summers, 1994).  
 
On this basis, they argue that it may be unrealistic to expect primary teachers, espe
those with no science qualifications, to acquire adequa
th
Mant, 1998; see also Osborne & Simon, 1996). And so these authors concentrate their 
efforts on defining a more limited range of significant science concepts that primary 
teachers need to understand and are capable of understanding. Summers and Mant, for 
example, discuss those aspects of the concept of energy that ought to be included in the
UK Science National Curriculum, arguing that these should replace the ones concern
with balanced and unbalanced forces that many teachers find it difficult to understand (se
also Summers, 1994). Such specific recommendations, as well as arguments about 
teachers’ lack of scientific understanding, are based on research into teachers’ response
to interviews and/or questionnaires; these often being administered before and after their 
participation in in-service education courses designed to help them acquire conceptu
understanding of scientific concepts (see, e.g., Summers & Mant, 1995).  
 
“Small range” constructivists recognize that teachers are capable of constructing 
conceptual structures during their everyday interactions with aspects of the
b
scientific understanding (see, e.g., Summers, 1994). What is assumed here is tha
involves a body of scientific propositions that have a precise and fixed meaning describing 
the universal properties present in all phenomena being described. By contrast, everyday
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conceptualizations are regarded as imprecise; they involve a variety of meanings or 
“intuitive beliefs” (Summers, 1994, p. 181), which are specific to the situations they 
describe. The term misconceptions is often used to describe those intuitive beliefs that are
“at odds with the currently accepted view of the science community” (Kruger, Palacio
Summers, 1992, p. 341). Following on from this idea, “small range” constructivists s
that scientific understanding can only be ensured if teachers are introduced to the correct 
definition of specific scientific concepts during in-service education courses prior to their 
engagement with practical activities (e.g., Summers et al., 1997a, b; Summers & Mant, 
1995).  
 
“Small range” constructivists give little emphasis to the development of teachers’ problem
solving procedural understanding
 
, & 
tress 
-
: their knowledge of the procedures needed to figure out 
hat a scientific problem is about, and to collect and interpret evidence in order to address 
 
ant 
ple 
ls’ 
 a 
 often referred to as cognitivism (see Bredo, 1999). 
ognitivism was developed in order to explain why students fail or succeed in acquiring 
 
re 
m 
w
it. However, they are concerned with teachers’ acquisition of practical skills, such as how 
to wire a circuit (see, e.g., Summers et al., 1997a). Indeed, they often imply that the 
development of problem-procedural knowledge follows automatically from the acquisition 
of simple concepts and process skills. Moreover, they suggest that scientific concepts can
be broken down into smaller parts and taught to teachers separately. Summers and M
(1998), for example, identify, in order of difficulty, seven “simple concepts” (p. 13) 
associated with aspects of electricity, which were easily understood by most primary 
teachers who participated in an in-service course on the topic. This points to a sequential 
view of knowledge acquisition on the part of these constructivists: the idea that sim
concepts, facts, and process skills (lower functions of cognition) are basic in individua
knowledge, and operate as prerequisites to learning higher-order forms of knowledge, 
such as complex concepts and problem-solving procedural knowledge (see Greeno, 
Pearson, & Schoenfeld, 1999).  
 
It is important to note here that the sequential view of knowledge acquisition is part of
broader psychological approach,
C
academic knowledge (see Murphy, 1999). It uses computational methods and metaphors
to model human learning and understanding, and is based on the assumption that the
are certain universal features of human cognition (e.g., cognitive structures and short-ter
memory) that explain human learning in general. Moreover, it assumes that human 
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thinking involves logical deduction using context-free rules. In particular, within this 
approach knowledge is seen as a property of the individual mind, acquired during the 
course of solving well-defined problems thrown up by the environment.2 During this 
process, encoded symbols from the environment are stored in the individual’s memo
hierarchical structures that stand in one-to-one correspondence with the problem in the
world. From a sequential perspective, learners are expected to learn, first of all, the 
properties of the concepts of a discipline, and then the procedures by which such 
concepts are used to solve paradigmatic problems (see Watts, 1983). In turn, individuals
understanding of the properties of a specific scientific concept is assessed according
their ability to correctly classify instances as examples or non-examples of that con
(see Gagné, 1970; Klausmeier, Ghatala, & Frayer, 1974).  
 
This cognitivist view of knowledge underpins the methods used by “small range” 
constructivists to measure the adequacy of teachers’ knowl
ry in 
 
’ 
 to 
cept 
edge of specific scientific 
oncepts. These are semi-structured interviews and multiple-choice questionnaires (see, 
er of 
 
 
er et 
ires 
 to classify 
orrectly a limited number of instances associated with a particular concept, and to give 
quacy of 
c
e.g., Summers & Kruger, 1992). The interviews are carried out with a small numb
teachers using a deck of cards as a focus; the cards depicting events such as “a book
lying on a table”, or real objects such as a “jumping toy car” (Summers & Kruger) and 
three-dimensional models (e.g., Mant & Summers, 1995). These events are used to 
prompt discussion about a particular aspect of a situation, such as the role of energy 
(Summers & Kruger). The interviews precede the questionnaires, which usually aim to
establish the prevalence of misconceptions in a larger sample of teachers (e.g., Krug
al., 1992; Summers & Mant, 1995).3 Since the aim of such interviews and questionna
is to identify teachers’ existing knowledge, particular emphasis is placed on not helping 
teachers with their responses (e.g., Summers, Kruger, Mant, & Childs, 1998).  
 
The adequacy of teachers’ science knowledge is determined by analysis of their 
responses to such interviews and questionnaires. It is assumed that their ability
c
reasons for their decisions in terms of a predefined explanation, indicates the ade
their understanding: interpreted as their capacity to use the same concept in the future.  
In evaluating this first type of constructivism, a key issue for consideration is whether 
adequacy of knowledge measured by interviews and questionnaires actually captures 
teachers’ practical science expertise.  
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 As already noted, for “small ideas” constructivism teachers’ ability to explain experience
correctly is a matter of their matching th
 
e properties and relationships specified in a set of 
entences with the properties and relationships present in the instances being described. 
e 
 
entical 
er self-
 
ts 
 and 
ers because understanding takes 
lace over time and in context, rather than necessarily occurring at a fixed and predictable 
on, 
tion 
s
There is a tacit belief here in representationalism, the idea that symbols mirror reality (se
Bredo, 1999). Yet a belief in representationalism could only be sustained if each scientific 
concept gathered together identical instances or at least very similar ones (Barnes, 1982).
Under such conditions, the application of such concepts would be unproblematic, and their 
involvement in science generalizations could make the application of other terms 
straightforward. For example, the statement that a force is a pull or a push could be used 
to provide a precise and adequate explanation of all the instances associated with force, if 
it could be asserted that the instances associated with the terms pull or push are id
(the extension of the concept). In such a case, of course, the extension only needs to 
include one instance that could be the very idea of “force”, “pull”, and “push”. This 
suggests an essentialist account of concept application. However, in practice, instances of 
scientific concepts are not identical. For all the complexity of language, experience is 
much more complex and richer in information. Physical objects and events are nev
evidently identical with one another or possessed of a common essence (see Barnes, 
1974, 1982). Given this, teachers’ ability to make sense of experience is a much more
complex matter than a cognitivist view of mind allows; it is fraught with ambiguity and 
uncertainty (see Bruner, 1986). Responding to a situation involves exercising judgemen
about which concept is applicable in the particular situation, judgements that are often 
influenced by teachers’ perceptions and interpretations of the specifics of the situation
that cannot be easily codified or made entirely explicit.  
 
Following on from this, uncertainty or even failure in the task situation does not 
necessarily indicate lack of expertise on the part of teach
p
point. Indeed, some researchers argue that, given the dynamic nature of cogniti
interviews “can only provide clues to ongoing cognitive processes” (Welzel & Roth, 1998, 
p. 40; see also Roth, 1996). Teachers may fail to respond adequately to interview and 
questionnaire demands, but reconstruct their understanding in a more scientific direc
as they reflect on the problem later.  
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Finally, unlike the problems dealt with in interviews and questionnaires, those faced by 
teachers in classrooms may not be well defined and therefore will need to be actively 
amed as problems before they are solved. Children’s questions and ideas about 
 
y may 
 
on 
 
l 
th such 
 are able to apply correctly in explaining a limited number of 
ituations associated with them, this still leaves open the possibility that teachers may not 
n 
eviously 
ge in primary science. Some of these concern the 
ssumptions about the nature of knowledge, and about teachers’ development of scientific 
fr
scientific concepts and phenomena may be expressed within contexts that are far more 
ambiguous and complex than the instances to which teachers are asked to respond in
constructivist research. Given this, in order for teachers to deal with such cases the
need to figure out the nature of the situation first, before they decide which concept is the
most appropriate to use (see Bruner, 1986; Greeno et al., 1999). Figuring out the situati
may include framing and reframing the problem depicted in an instance, and trying out a 
number of different concepts to explain it, testing hypotheses, discussing the instance with
the children in the classroom, or reading about specific concepts in resource books. In 
doing this, teachers may need the problem-solving procedural knowledge of science to 
which “small range” constructivism gives little emphasis. Moreover, decisions about how to 
respond to situations that arise during teaching are often made on the spot, which 
heightens the need for contextual judgement and teachers’ reliance on their pedagogica
expertise. However, the courses based on this approach do not introduce teachers to 
ways of thinking about ill-defined problems or pedagogical strategies for dealing wi
problem situations.  
 
It can be suggested, therefore, that even if a range of science concepts can be defined 
that primary teachers
s
be able to apply the same concepts successfully in all future situations. In other words, i
some situations teachers may still express misconceptions about concepts they pr
appeared to understand adequately.  
 
In summary, there are some serious questions to be raised about this way of approaching 
teachers’ adequacy of subject knowled
a
understanding. Others relate to the methods used to measure the adequacy of teachers’ 
understanding. Above all, there are significant questions about the relationship between 
the understanding that teachers display in interviews and questionnaires and their 
practical expertise: their ability to use scientific knowledge in classroom situations.  
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“Big Ideas” Constructivists  
A second group of researchers in primary science education, those whom I called ‘big 
eas” constructivists, argue that the subject knowledge that primary teachers need to 
possess in order to teach science effectively consists of conceptual understanding of a 
ciples (the “Big Ideas of Science”), along with 
 
ual 
t 
 are formed. (p. 7)  
 turn, the necessary procedural understanding involves understanding how science 
begins w
proceed
vestig
involves 
nding is the 
eans for acquiring conceptual understanding. In other words, knowledge of how to do 
 
f 
e similarities between these; and 
at teachers’ misunderstandings can be seen as resulting from their making inappropriate 
e. 
id
small number of broad scientific prin
procedural understanding characteristic of a proper scientific orientation (Harlen, 1999,
2000; Harlen & Holroyd, 1995, 1996).4 Discussing the importance of teachers’ concept
understanding of the “Big Ideas of Science”, Harlen (1997) says:  
 
Why “big ideas”? Because these are, in the end, what we want children to 
understand— not particular muscles in the arm, not the particular position of tha
image in the plain mirror, but the general ideas that help to explain muscle action 
wherever it happens and all the phenomena where images
 
In
ith observation, and raising questions about what has been observed, and 
s through predictions and hypothesizing, planning and carrying out an 
ation, and collecting and interpreting data (see, e.g., Harlen, 2000).  in
 
“Big ideas” constructivists believe that the understanding of science develops as 
individuals interact with their own experience and with the ideas of others, and 
conceptual change (see Harlen, 1999). On such a view, procedural understa
m
science develops interactively with knowledge of the concepts of science. So, this
approach to teachers’ subject knowledge places emphasis on problem-solving aspects o
procedural knowledge, which “small range” constructivists consider higher order and 
perhaps beyond the reach of many primary teachers.  
 
Another difference is that, while “small range” constructivists draw a sharp distinction 
between teachers’ everyday conceptualizations of physical phenomena and scientific 
concepts, “big ideas” constructivists argue that there ar
th
links between experience and knowledge or from use of misleading everyday languag
Moreover, these constructivists argue that it is possible to foster and develop further 
teachers’ ability to test their ideas against evidence, to the point that it takes the form of 
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scientific inquiry, thereby helping them to make appropriate links between knowledge and 
experience. Influenced by Vygotsky’s work, this group of researchers also emphasizes th
role of social interaction with more knowledgeable others in the development of scien
understanding (see Harlen, 1996; Harlen & Holroyd, 1995, 1996).  
 
Following on from this, “big ideas” constructivists stress that, although some scientific 
ideas are more difficult for teachers to understand than others, “given the opportunity, 
teachers can come to a scientific view of many things, linking up the
e 
tific 
ir existing experience, 
sing their common sense” (Harlen, 2000, p. 229). In turn, they describe teachers’ 
, 
f 
 is 
ose produced by a battery-operated circuit that includes a switch and a 
ulb) that are associated with specific scientific ideas (e.g., “current flow needs a circuit of 
r 
 
r 
dged to be 
ppropriate because what is taken as teachers’ knowledge is not the knowledge that 
u
knowledge of science as a network of links between scientific concepts and experience
which can be extended as they make new links between scientific concepts and ways o
interpreting evidence. Thus, developing procedural understanding is seen as the key to 
educating primary science practitioners. This is not just because this understanding
fundamental in helping teachers acquire conceptual knowledge of the “Big Ideas of 
Science”, but also because it is closely related to the ways in which teachers should help 
children develop their own scientific understanding in the classroom (see, e.g., Harlen, 
1999, 2000).  
 
Like the first type of constructivism, “big ideas” constructivists also use interviews to 
determine teachers’ adequacy of scientific understanding. Teachers are presented with 
events (e.g., th
b
suitable materials”). During interviews the teachers are asked to discuss the particula
event and to arrive at a “collaborative explanation” (Harlen, 1996, p. 6) for the event; in 
other words, an explanation that is satisfactory for both the teacher and the interviewer.
Thus, the interviewer might direct teachers’ attention to problem-solving aspects of an 
event, and/or suggest to them ideas to test out. And, in doing this the interviews may 
provide a model that facilitates teachers’ procedural understanding.  
 
Helping teachers in developing their explanations differentiates this approach from the 
previous one, in which teachers are not offered any kind of support in the interviews o
questionnaires. For “big ideas” constructivists this kind of support is ju
a
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teachers appear already to possess, but the understanding they are capable of achievin
under the guidance of another more knowledgeable person.  
 
Despite these important differences, this approach to teachers’ expertise, like the first,
treats knowledge from a cognitivist perspective. It seems to be assumed, for example, that
once teachers have achieved a collaborative explanation for a
g 
 
 
 particular event, they have 
cquired adequate knowledge for applying the concept in the future, both in the classroom 
ivist 
erpretation of the relation between teachers’ 
nowledge and their classroom expertise. They assume a universalistic view of scientific 
ntially 
th in 
dy 
 it occurs. A sociocultural approach to cognition offers 
 rather different picture of knowledge, understanding, and learning—one that has 
 
a
and in other contexts. Indeed, doubts that might surround the interpretation of problem-
solving situations seem only to be treated as acceptable during teachers’ acquisition of 
subject knowledge. These are not regarded as a significant part of teachers’ responses to 
situations that arise during teaching, at least not when they relate to a concept of which 
teachers have already been shown to possess adequate understanding. Instead, it is 
expected that such problem-solving situations are well defined, and that they can be 
resolved either by the retrieval of the correct “Big Idea of Science” or by the application of 
a clearly defined scientific procedure.  
 
What I am arguing, then, is that, despite their important differences, the two construct
approaches to teachers’ subject knowledge I have discussed share some limitations in 
common, especially in terms of their int
k
knowledge: the idea that the concepts of science are abstract, precise entities that can be 
internalized by the individual teacher. Moreover, both approaches treat teachers’ 
understanding as taking the form of acquired, commodity-like knowledge that is esse
decontextualized and available to be applied across situations. From their point of view, 
once primary teachers have acquired the correct understanding of scientific concepts 
and/or of scientific procedures, they should be able to apply them in the future, bo
classrooms and in other situations.  
 
My questioning of these assumptions is based on some recent developments in the stu
of cognition. These emphasize that the construction of knowledge cannot be seen as 
independent of the situation in which
a
important implications for how teachers’ adequacy of science knowledge might be defined,
and for how it relates to classroom practice.  
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 Sociocultural Approaches to Knowledge and Understanding  
Unlike cognitivist approaches to mind, which treat the concepts and ideas expressed in 
tuations they describe—language as representing the si and, therefore, as having an 
existence independent from the situation in which they were produced—sociocultural 
of a 
articular line of activity that take their meaning from the context of that activity (e.g., 
ing 
 various communities of practice, ranging from scholarly 
isciplines such as science or history to groups of people sharing a common interest, 
es 
te 
le 
h 
 
ool and 
hus, from a sociocultural perspective, an individual’s understanding of the concepts, 
theories  
situation
underst comes internalized by the 
theories view the concepts and ideas expressed in language as the products 
p
Brown & Palinscar, 1989; Collins, Brown, & Newman, 1989; Newman, Griffin, & Cole, 
1989; Wertsch, 1985).  
 
Like “big ideas” constructivists, they draw on Vygotsky’s work, but this time in treat
language as providing the means or tools for social coordination and adaptation (see 
Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 1989; Putman & Borko, 2000). Throughout their lives, 
individuals participate in
d
including those operating in particular classrooms. Each of these communities generat
tools, a set of shared social meanings, which its members use to interpret and negotia
their interpretations with one another, thereby enabling them to continue to act 
successfully in the activities of that community. In the course of this process, peop
develop, often tacitly, rich networks of links between specific tools and situations, whic
are employed to make sense of future situations. And because situations are not fixed or 
identical, each time an individual uses a tool to construct understanding of a new situation
that resembles an old one, he/she develops a better understanding of both the t
the situation itself. As Brown et al. put it:  
 
People who use tools actively rather than just acquire them build an increasingly 
rich implicit understanding of the world in which they use the tools and of the tools 
themselves. The understanding, both of the world and of the tool, continually 
changes as a result of their interaction. (1989, p. 33)  
 
T
, and ideas of a particular community is a dynamic process resulting from acting in
s and from negotiating with other members of that community. Furthermore, such 
anding is constructed first on a social plane before it be
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individual, and is best described as an “evolving spiral” (Murphy, personal 
communication), in which lower mental functions (e.g., concepts and facts, and simple 
process skills) and higher mental functions (problem-solving procedural knowledge, 
complex concepts, perception, remembering, etc.) develop interdependently as individuals
participate in socially and culturally organized activities.  
 
This is a very different approach from treating understanding as involving the applica
of a static set of concepts and procedures, as within cognitivist perspectives (Bredo, 1997, 
1999). For sociocultural theorists, the activity becomes th
 
tion 
e unit of analysis rather than the 
dividual’s mental structures. Indeed, they stress that individual actions and mental 
cy of 
r 
ction, but, 
ther, the individual must be prepared to deal with uncertainty. As Keller and Keller 
side from offering a different perspective about knowledge and how it develops, 
sociocu
suggest  
ommunity where they learn through cognitive apprenticeship its language, and other 
 
91; 
 
s of a 
in
representations are only understandable as integral elements of the activity systems in 
which they function, and which they in turn constitute (e.g., Engestörm, 1988).  
 
Following on from this, sociocultural theorists emphasize the ambiguity and contingen
understanding. They argue that knowledge is organized for a particular task; it can neve
be sufficiently detailed and precise to anticipate exactly the conditions of future a
ra
(1993) put it:  
 
An individual’s knowledge is simultaneously to be regarded as representational 
and emergent, prepatterned and aimed at coming to terms with actions and 
products that go beyond the already known. (p. 127)  
 
A
ltural theory also carries particular implications about learning and expertise. It 
s that learning involves enculturating novices into the practices of a particular
c
cultural patterns of communication, as well as how to make decisions about which
conceptual and procedural tools to use in order to solve well-defined and ill-defined 
problems of their community (e.g., Brown et al., 1989; Cobb, 1994; Lave & Wenger, 19
Rogoff, 1994; Roth, 1995). On this view, the “master” or expert is relatively more skilled
than the novice in terms of having a broader understanding of the important feature
cultural activity. However, the expert’s depth and breadth of understanding is still 
developing in the process of carrying out the activity and in deciding which tools to use in 
order to guide others successfully in it (see Rogoff, 1990). Thus, the essence of an 
 12
individual’s expertise is its functionality: the ability to employ knowledge as a resource in 
order to pursue situated, contextualized goals emanating from problem-solving situ
in specific communities of practice (see Greeno et al., 1999).  
 
It is important to note here that, like constructivist perspectives, sociocultural theorists als
emphasize the crucial function that knowledge plays in practice (see Edwards, 2005; 
Tobin, 1998). However, given that sociocultural theorists recog
ations 
o 
nize the essential and 
separable roles of cultural tools, social activity, and individual efforts, they argue that the 
n 
chers can be seen 
s participating in a variety of communities of practice, such as those formed by staff in a 
d 
cting 
 the 
formances of those who are recognized as experts in their local 
ommunities of practice. Rather than relying on semi-structured interviews and 
spectives 
h 
 and how 
in
assessment of an individual’s knowledge should be based on how this person performs, 
and not on what this person says about his/her own performance or on what he/she ca
and cannot do in artificial situations (see Rogoff, 1990; Roth, 1999).  
 
This last point has particular implications for assessing primary teachers’ adequacy of 
science subject knowledge, since it directs our attention to the study of teachers’ 
performance in the activities of their communities of practice. Also, tea
a
particular school, those made up of teachers and mentors in initial teacher education an
continuing professional development courses, and those constituted by their intera
with children in particular classrooms. In turn, the nature of the problem situations with 
which teachers deal depends on their context, and different problems require different 
kinds of solution, which in turn require differential use of cultural tools. On this view, 
teachers’ adequacy of subject knowledge is a complicated issue that involves assessing 
their use, and limitations on their use, of cultural tools in relation to particular tasks in 
particular contexts.  
 
In other words, a sociocultural approach to teacher expertise also carries some 
methodological implications. It suggests that this needs to be investigated in action; in
perspectives and per
c
questionnaires to assess the knowledge that teachers possess, sociocultural per
indicate a need to make use of the qualitative methodological traditions that have been 
developed in anthropology and sociology, in which participant observation and in-dept
interviewing are employed to understand what people do in everyday situations,
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their perspectives on the world are implicated in their activities (e.g., Denzin & Lincoln, 
1994; Guile & Young, 1998; Lave, 1988; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Wenger, 1998).  
 
Only a small amount of research has been carried out in science education adopting a 
sociocultural approach (Rosebery, 1998; Rosebery, & Puttick, 1998; Traianou, 2003; 
raianou, 2006; Warren & Rosebery, 1996). Rosebery and Puttick carried out a study of 
s 
of 
 
ing 
e also 
oyancy and density. These investigations were often 
itiated by the teachers’ own questions about a phenomenon. They were conducted in 
, 
 
 turn, 
d the 
mas and confusion they had about their 
tudents’ learning, their practice, and curricula. These included questions about the 
T
14 newly qualified elementary teachers who were not science specialists. The focus wa
on the ways in which they developed their understanding of science and the teaching 
science during the first 4 years of their teaching. This study, which was part of a large 
professional development project, was framed by the assumption that, in expert teaching,
uncertainty and how one deals with it plays as important a role as the certainty that 
derives from accumulated knowledge and experience. Thus, during the teachers’ learn
about science and the teaching of science, the researchers sought to foster a culture 
where instances of not knowing were given equal status to instances of knowing (se
Ball, 1998; Duckworth, 1987).  
 
As learners of science, teachers were asked to carry out investigations in areas such as 
motion and acceleration, and bu
in
small groups to enable them to become engaged in debate with colleagues about their 
existing ideas as well as about current scientific explanations and theories. During this
they were encouraged to ask, and seek answers to their own questions; to explore 
problems and resources; to collect, analyse, and interpret data; to construct, juxtapose, 
and interpret graphical representations; to compare their methods and results with those
of others; and to use the theories of others, including the standard explanations of 
science, as tools in their work. Teachers were encouraged to keep diaries about 
significant aspects of their learning, including any confusions or dilemmas that occurred 
during their process of learning science and how they went about resolving them. In
selected episodes of their learning were often discussed with other colleagues an
researchers during unstructured interviews.  
 
As teachers of science, participants examined videotaped episodes of science lessons 
from their own classrooms and explored dilem
s
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language the students used and what they did during a science activity as well as what 
could be learned from these about children’s science thinking and learning. To respond
such questions, teachers were expected and encouraged to draw upon multiple 
resources, including their own understanding of the phenomenon under study, their 
knowledge of individual children, their own understanding of learning and teaching, as well 
as their pedagogical understanding.  
 
One important finding from this study is that teachers’ science subject knowledge 
develops over time in contingent ways
 to 
, and facilitating this requires offering them 
pportunities not only to get deeply engaged with complex scientific ideas, theories, and 
to deal 
 
 
’ 
ific 
non. 
e 
s 
 
 
3; Traianou, 2006). 
ere, data were used from unstructured interviews, email messages, the teacher’s own 
 
o
practices, but also to reflect on and think through ways of employing cultural tools 
with well-defined and ill-defined problem situations. Moreover, it is argued that the
development of teachers’ understanding of science cannot be easily separated from their
understanding of pedagogy. It was often found, for example, that during both the teachers
inquiries in science and their inquiries in teaching and learning, discussion of scient
ideas on the one hand and discussion about children’s learning and pedagogical practice 
on the other occurred simultaneously. Indeed, as teachers participated in their own 
scientific activity they found themselves questioning how they might teach a scientific 
phenomenon such as acceleration to children. Similarly, in analysing aspects of their 
teaching, they questioned their own understanding of a particular scientific phenome
For instance, as one teacher considered her students’ explanation that “air” was what 
allowed a big, heavy boat to float, she probed her own understanding of density and th
role it played in buoyancy. This led her to further explore the complex ideas that explain 
flotation as well as to question and develop her own pedagogical practices. As teacher
were gaining more experience in learning about and teaching science, they became more
capable in using creatively cultural tools both in terms of developing their own learning of
science and in developing their pedagogy and classroom practices.  
 
Similar findings have been reported in an in-depth study of one expert primary science 
practitioner (for a detailed description of this study, see Traianou, 200
H
writing, and classroom observation to portray the teacher’s views about her own subject
knowledge and the role it plays in her teaching, her beliefs about the learning and 
teaching of science, and her practice. One outcome of this study is that teacher expertise 
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is eclectic in character, drawing on a variety of pedagogical strategies and theories of 
learning in dealing with the contingent situations faced in the classroom. Subject 
knowledge plays a significant role in helping teachers to interpret and act successfully in 
these situations and to deal with other tasks. Indeed, this study suggests that teachers
subject knowledge is functional, context specific, and integrated with features of th
classroom situation or the task that teachers are aiming to accomplish. For example, the 
teacher in this study uses multiple ways of assessing her own understanding of science 
and diverse strategies for developing it further. Some of these relate to her ability to 
explain adequately to colleagues aspects of the scientific concepts that they have to teach
and their responses to this. Equally important is a metacognitive awareness about the 
organization and synthesis of her scientific understanding. In other words, this teache
expertise enables her to distinguish the aspects of scientific knowledge she understands 
from those that she does not grasp and develop these further. Her subject knowledge a
helps her to plan learning objectives and practical activities, organize her teaching in an 
exploratory way, and recognize children’s everyday ideas that are different from the 
current scientific knowledge. However, she emphasizes the contingency of her scientific 
understanding by arguing that providing explanations that arise during teaching and 
relating them to scientific concepts is not always a straightforward process, even whe
she has taught them before. As an example, she describes an episode that followed work
with her Year 5 class (10–11 years old) about forces. In this episode she was discuss
with the children the forces that act on a person on a floating boat when she found herse
wondering about the possibility of the person on the boat being weightless. Situations like 
this often appear during her teaching and she has developed certain strategies for dealing
with them, such as thinking about the problem alone, or engaging the children in the 
process by asking questions that aim to interpret and clarify the problem. In these ways, a 
solution to problems is sought, yet this simultaneously involves developing her own and 
the children’s learning of a particular scientific concept. In this way, she develops a 
repertoire of ways of dealing with specific problem situations, which, in turn, she employs 
to respond to new situations that she sees as similar to and yet different from those 
experienced in the past.  
 
’ 
e 
 
r’s 
lso 
n 
 
ing 
lf 
 
 16
Conclusion  
In this article, I have argued that there are some important differences between the two 
f the 
eachers 
s 
 they 
y contrast, sociocultural perspectives argue that knowledge is tied to action, and 
s upon 
 is important to note that a sociocultural perspective does not imply complete rejection of 
his 
ntexts, the 
ach 
 of 
main constructivist lines of thinking about teacher expertise that have been influential 
within UK research on primary science education. These concern their interpretation o
relationship between conceptual and procedural knowledge, and of the role that social 
interaction plays in the construction of teachers’ scientific understanding. These 
differences determine the kind and level of scientific understanding that primary t
are judged to be capable of acquiring, and hence the foundation of their classroom 
expertise. Nevertheless, I have argued, both “small” and “big” ideas constructivism 
underestimate the complexity of practice. They treat the understanding that teacher
display during semi-structured interviews and questionnaires as commodity-like 
knowledge that is available to be applied in future and classroom situations. And
assume that failure to display such understanding indicates an incapacity to teach the 
relevant scientific concepts in the classroom.  
 
B
emphasize the idea that understanding is often messy and contingent, and depend
processes of interpretation and negotiation in which the problem at hand and judgements 
about which cultural tool to use are recurrently formulated and reformulated. On this view, 
teachers’ subject knowledge is a resource whose adequacy is determined by functionality; 
it must be judged in terms of teachers’ ability to employ tools skilfully in order to achieve 
specific goals that emerge as they participate in the activities of various communities of 
practice in which they are involved, especially those that develop in classrooms.  
 
It
the methods used by constructivist research in assessing the adequacy of primary 
teachers’ scientific understanding. However, it does suggest that the findings from t
kind of research need to be treated with great caution, and that they should be 
supplemented by in-depth study of teachers’ use of cultural tools in particular co
limitations involved in their practice, and how these are related to the practical 
communities in which they participate. Research carried out following this appro
suggests that expert teachers develop a dynamic repertoire of context-specific forms
knowledge that help them to see new situations as both similar and yet different from 
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those encountered previously, and that it is only in this way that they learn more effective 
modes of practice.  
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